contesting, cooperating, and circumventing. // AS VEHICLES CONTINUE to evolve into mobile computing platforms, 1 the closed automotive software ecosystem, whose standards and rules of access has been dominated for decades by car manufacturers, is opening. If this opening up occurs, independent automotive software developers will have the potential to play a more important role in the software ecosystem, engaging directly with automakers and consumers. There is also the potential for open source operating systems and open innovation, especially in the car information and entertainment, or infotainment, layer. This possibility seems especially exciting because onboard software has expanded by a factor of 15 within less than a decade, 1 and new car-to-cloud services, such as telematics car insurance policies, are likely to become ubiquitous among millions of drivers. 2 The opening of the car software platforms and related ecosystem is not going to happen without some resistance. The strategic management literature advises the established major auto firms to preserve influence, control standards, and sustain profitable strategic bottlenecks. [3] [4] [5] This will be challenging, as the auto industry is encountering four disruptions at once: automation, connectivity, electrification, and sharing. As part of the debate on access to car software and data, our research questions are as follows: What are the strategies available for digital innovators in the emerging software ecosystem? What do these strategies mean for value creation and capture?
We present three cases that capture a current snapshot of the dynamics of the car software ecosystem-that is, the actors, how they work together, and what this means for car digitalization. These cases represent examples of strategies advocated by experts: specifically, the strategy of software actors cooperating with the bottleneck owners, the strategy of software actors circumventing the bottleneck, which may be possible through the wider digital ecosystems, and the strategy of software actors contesting the existing bottleneck. Two of the cases are current projects undertaken by Bosch, which is not a car manufacturer but a major supplier. The company is the world's largest car-part maker, employing 400,000 people worldwide. Bosch is very active in software and software innovation, spending nearly one-tenth of its revenue on R&D with a strong emphasis on cloud data services. The first project exemplifies cooperation; it has collected roughly 6 million data sets from 2.2 million cars through a car manufacturer's licensed workshops. The second project illustrates how the mobile Internet infrastructure allows Bosch to circumvent car manufacturers, although in a constrained context. The final case is about Tesla; we briefly mention the costs, risks, and opportunities of contesting the industry's bottleneck by becoming a car manufacturer.
Strategic Bottlenecks
A strategic bottleneck is a place that obstructs a flow; for example, if all roads pass through a single bridge, then the bridge is a bottleneck. In the context of a software ecosystem, a strategic bottleneck is "a critical part of a technical system that has no-or very poor-alternatives at the present time." 3 In the automobile industry, the major car manufacturers have historically controlled the industry's architecture for both hardware and software. That is, they have controlled who can do what (division of labor) and who gets what (division of revenue). 4 Strategy scholars (such as Teece and Jacobides) suggest that software actors who are either inside or wish to be a party in the ecosystem have a choice among three strategies:
• Cooperate with a strategic bottleneck owner, a low-risk strategy that limits the innovator's ability to profit from its work.
• Circumvent the strategic bottleneck, a riskier strategy that raises the possibilities of profits.
• Contest the strategic bottleneck.
Bottlenecks are unique or expensive to copy. Contestation has the greatest opportunity to create and capture value, but it requires a large investment and may be risky.
The Automotive Software Ecosystem
Cars are possibly the most complex artifact that consumers own. The car is expensive, heavy, and fast-moving. It operates in public spaces and is regulated for safety and environmental effect. A typical car contains approximately 30,000 mechanical, hydraulic, electrical, and electronic parts, between 20 and 90 electronic control units (ECUs), and millions of lines of code. There are a dozen or so large car manufacturers [original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)]. Over the past few decades, they have captured approximately three-quarters of the industry's added value, as measured by total market capitalization. 5 This dominance is based on the manufacturers' role as system integrators, their control of the customer experience, and their regulatory accountability. The industry's slow clock speed also helps this domination. 5 Even though the car appears to be a very physical object, software has controlled car components, such as fuel injection, steering systems, and brakes, since the 1980s. In 2003, Automotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR) and its related software ecosystem were established by a partnership of manufacturers and suppliers. AUTOSAR includes a standardized set of hardware-dependent software components and a large set of hardware-independent application interfaces. This enables the development, integration, and validation of applications independently and caters to multiple suppliers. There are many related standards and tools, such as standards for diagnostics and calibration, guidance for the static analysis of C programming, and the Japanese car software standard. It is notable that the common industry practice is to deploy software into the car only by the car manufacturer, preventing deployment by third parties or consumers, 7 and thus making the related software ecosystem closed.
The current industry software ecosystem includes hundreds of companies that develop software for the vehicles' ECUs. Many are traditional hardware suppliers, like Bosch, that are also engaged in software and the related physical subsystems. There are also many that sell only software that is not embedded in hardware. In addition, there are several open source automotive software projects and related communities, such as COMASSO and BUSMASTER; these are active and popular projects, but they are not yet major players in the industry.
Currently, the automotive industry is encountering four disruptions-automation, connectivity, electrification, and sharing-that are all related to software. In response, OEMs are trying to shape the future ecosystem. 8 Standard-setting consortia are currently enlarging their scope to include communication, telematics, user-interface modeling, and so on. Several operating systems of the vehicles' communication control have emerged, including Automotive Grade Linux and
New-car digital services, which are already offered, are one result of these deployments. For example, insurance products that monitor driving behavior and reduce premiums for careful drivers have been used by almost 1 million customers in the United Kingdom, 2 and Tesla famously remotely extended the range of some of its electric cars during Hurricane Irma. Detailing these services and initiatives is beyond our goals. However, a possible future industry architecture may be seen through a recent position paper published by the European Automobile Manufacturers Association. 13 Given considerations of safety and privacy, the association's policy is that OEMs have the responsibility for transferring data from vehicles and that third parties will be able to access data only via the OEMs. Our research questions are, again:
• What are the strategies available for digital innovators in this emerging software ecosystem? • What do these strategies mean for value creation and value capture?
Three Strategies and Cases
To illustrate the three strategies, we present three minicases. The first shows how Bosch is cooperating with a car manufacturer to collect data from millions of cars as they are used by customers. Currently, the cooperation is achieved at a technical level, and its current value lies in Bosch obtaining new shared knowledge that can be used to improve current components and systems. Bosch believes that these benefits have been considerable. In the near future, we expect similar technology to materialize as predictive maintenance services. For example, a driver will be able to buy a service that will monitor the car subsystems while driving and suggest crucial maintenance prior to a long trip. Another example may be temperaturecontrolled trucks. Their operators would buy a predictive maintenance subscription to prevent mishaps while carrying expensive cargo. The Bosch project concerns an electronic stability control (ESC) system that controls the braking system; a system that includes sensors, actuators, pumps, ECUs, and related software. 9 Bosch obtained the right to collect and analyze the data. In return, Bosch is conducting annual workshops to inform the manufacturer's engineers. The data collection module was developed as part of the ESC software. The sensor and actuator drivers were written in C, while data and control flow were modeled with the AS-CET code generator, which is popular for embedded software. The full ESC project employed hundreds of developers, with four engineers focusing on the data collection software. The development process followed a documented waterfall methodology (Vmodel) and Automotive SPICE process assessment.
Data collection was planned carefully: the project defined a priori what data to measure to answer specific engineering issues. Such data included minimal or maximal values, averages, histograms, or other multidimensional structures. The resulting data set was only 1.7 kB, and the software updated it frequently during the vehicle operation. The data were collected at the manufacturer's licensed workshops and garages using the onboard diagnostics protocol transferred to the manufacturer and then to Bosch. To date, 6 million data sets have been collected from 2.2 million cars worldwide. These data sets have created a new understanding of the actual operation of the braking system along its life.
Although Bosch believes that this project has had value, it is limited in the kind of data it can access and the ways it can exploit that data. Other companies, considering this strategy, may be similarly constrained, but they may also feel that additional value will be created when offering new services based on data, such as predictive maintenance. In other words, the current project is anchored in a manufacturer-supplier dyad, but future projects should create a more open ecosystem where other players will provide new services based on similar data collection technology.
The second example shows how Bosch has been able to circumvent the car manufacturers' control by its exploitation of open standards and movement toward an open vehicular software ecosystem. This case is a wrong-way driver warning (WDW) service, which is possible because of the openness that mobile phones introduced into the ecosystem. Interestingly, the core components of the technology, including maps and algorithms, are also taken from the public domain. WDW services warn drivers when they attempt to enter a highway in the opposing direction of traffic. An average of 265 fatal wrong-way crashes occur annually in the United States, resulting in 355 fatalities. 8 Recently, Nissan, Toyota, and Mercedes installed warning systems in luxury models.
Bosch started to develop a cloudbased WDW in 2015. The team includes 15 programmers and data scientists and quality, operations, and project management experts. They use Scrum as the agile development methodology, Java for the back end, NodeJS for the front end, and Python for the algorithm. GPS technology is used to identify a location, and OpenStreetMap is the reference. The team found that the maps are accurate and updated often. Identification of wrong-way driving is done with a Monte Carlo algorithm called particle filter that is executed on the cloud. The system was initiated as a pilot in Germany in April 2017, and it was downloaded by 40,000 drivers. It traveled 90% of the 31,000 driveways in Germany, identified one true wrong-way drive, and misjudged only 0.004% drives as wrong way. At present, value and value capture for Bosch are uncertain, and many possibilities are yet to be explored. For example, Bosch could charge drivers, but it has also considered charging insurance companies. Despite these uncertainties, Bosch is pleased with the project, as it fits the company's established automotive expertise and its new open data skills.
Finally, the direct way to contest the bottleneck is to become a car manufacturer, a strategy adopted by Tesla. Investments in Tesla from 2004 to 2017 approached US$12.5 billion. Currently, Tesla's customer experience is good, but mass manufacturing has not been realized yet. Specifically, car owners report high satisfaction rates, and more than 500,000 customers have ordered the Model 3. However, as of now, Tesla has manufactured only 250,000 cars. Production delays continue, and its negative free cash has exceeded US$1 billion per quarter. 11 Thus, at present, Tesla's contestation is promising but still not successful.
Tesla's contribution to the automotive industry's software ecosystem is already being felt. Its approach is simultaneously open and closed, and Tesla's over-the-air updates of car software and other software-related innovations promote demand for the connected car and push the industry toward software and connectivity. Similarly, Tesla's announcement that it won't initiate patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use its technology promotes openness. However, Tesla prefers vertical integration in manufacturing, 12 and its software operation is also relatively integrated. It announced that it would not provide a software development kit to create third-party apps for its user interface, and its software and data are available only to its suppliers. Indeed, Tesla promotes software innovation, but it does so within a closed ecosystem.
A uthoritative observers predict a transition of the car industry from hardware-to software-defined vehicles, 1 which may also open up the software ecosystem in this industry. This article considers the strategies software innovators should take to participate in this transition. Applying ideas about industry architecture and strategic bottlenecks, 3, 4 we expect that car manufacturers will remain central, 5 although a new level of openness will emerge as a result of connecting cars to digital platforms. 8 The three simple strategies we suggest reflect these conclusions; particularly, that innovators can cooperate with car manufacturers, circumvent them with the new digital platforms, or try to become car manufacturers.
The current-day illustrations of the three strategies show their viability, but they also raise many questions. The strategy to cooperate with a bottleneck owner exemplifies the need for specific deep expertise as well as access to millions of cars for several years to create new value. We suggest that it is still unclear how services, such as predictive maintenance, may emerge. Will the car manufacturers be ready to share enough of the value with the experts? Will there be others in the ecosystem that can create such services? The strategy to circumvent shows that value can be created quickly and relatively inexpensively using public domain resources and standards. However, it is still unclear how to commercialize such services. Will drivers be ready to pay? If not, who will be ready to subsidize the services? And the strategy of contestation shows, with Tesla, the investment and risk but also that the disruptor keeps its own software ecosystem closed.
On a larger scale, the analysis of the automotive industry as it is entering the new era of the connected, electric, and shared car (not yet autonomous) shows the commercial realities of technology. We have seen in the last few years how web and mobile standards can enable monopolies. Similarly, the manufacturing scale and customer experience ownership of the car manufacturers will continue to be central to cars as mobile computing platforms. Innovators should strategically straddle openness and control as they are offered by these companies.
